Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)Typically, we wouldn't comment on a review of our own book. But Professor Dixson's review calls for exception, as he misrepresents arguments of our book, in some ways badly. Here, we clarify what we did write, and refer readers to pages or chapters where we wrote it.
1. Prof. Dixson implies that we claimed that women's estrus (and associated preferences) evolved as a strategy for seeking extra-pair copulation (EPC; see his pt. 3). We didn't. Human estrus, we argued, has a deep-time evolutionary origin dating to early vertebrates (chapter 8). Early humans hence possessed estrus prior to the evolution of human pair-bonding; estrus could not have originally evolved FOR EPC. Most of the evidence for homology in female preference during the fertile phase across mammalian species (including humans) we discuss has nothing to do with EPC (chapters 8, 9).
2. Nonetheless, human estrus, in some form (even if in some ways diminished), has been maintained since the evolution of pair-bonding (chapter 10). The question of whether estrous adaptations have been modified in the context of biparental care in humans is an open one. We propose that in some ways they have (chapters 10-12). We never suggest, however, that EPC is or has been rampant in human history (his pts. 2, 4), and our views don't imply it (pp. 239-241, 293-295). Indeed, we explicitly discuss evidence that it's rare (pp. 311-314), which leads us to question Prof. Dixson's statement that he read our book "carefully."
3. Relatedly, we explicitly emphasize the importance of paternal care to women's fitness (chapter 4) and, hence, the costs of EPC (e.g., pp. 307-311). In fact, we repeatedly argue that EPC rates are low precisely because of these costs (pp. 293-295, 311-314, 327). We're stunned that Prof. Dixson implies otherwise (his pt. 3). As we explain, however, rare EPC (and extra-pair paternity) is perfectly compatible with sexually antagonistic coevolution of the sort we describe, specifically when paternal care is very important (pp. 239-241, 293-295, 327; we cite leading authorities on sexual conflict, such as Arnqvist & Rowe, 2005). In raptors, like humans, male provisioning is crucial to offspring success and, accordingly, they have very low rates of extra-pair paternity (on average, ~1%). But males return to the nest to copulate with their mates up to 10 times a day, and the leading explanation is that they do so to assure paternity in the face of possible female EPC and persisting conflicts of interest between partners (pp. 297-298). As claims against our arguments about sexually antagonistic coevolution over potential female EPC, Prof. Dixson's assertions about the tremendous importance of paternal care and low EPC rates are non sequiturs (pp. 239-241, 293-295)
4. As Prof. Dixson notes (his pt. 4), we do claim that not all women could pair up with men who possess the most favorable genes. There's a simple mathematical argument behind that claim: In (near-)monogamy, if most females pair up then so do most males and, outside of Lake Wobegon, not every male can be above average (p. 238). So the claim that some females in any monogamously mating population might not be completely enamored with all of their mate's qualities hardly seems controversial; indeed, we're perplexed that Prof. Dixson imagines that every woman should be able to choose the best in a long-term mate (his pt. 4). In fact, several studies show that when women in their "real world" (to quote Prof. Dixson) are paired with men lacking features particularly attractive during estrus, they claim to experience greater attraction to men other than their partners specifically during estrus (pp. 247-253). Contrary to Prof. Dixson's claim (his pts. 1, 2), effect sizes are substantial. Nonetheless, we claim that virtually never does this attraction actually lead to EPC, and largely because losing a partner is often costly (pp. 311-314). But do these patterns of attraction (as well as men's greater vigilance of partners mid-cycle) speak to interesting phenomena of human relationships begging explanation? We certainly think so; readers can decide for themselves and, moreover, evaluate our proposed explanations. Prof. Dixson's complaints, however, take no aim at this matter whatsoever; they target claims he imagines we made, but never did.
5. We cite approximately 1200 scholarly works. Most come from evolutionary biology, reproductive biology, behavioral ecology, and anthropology. Perhaps half specifically pertain to humans, and a portion of those were authored by "evolutionary psychologists." If some arguments rely heavily on work of evolutionary psychologists, it's because these scholars, and not others, have done work pertinent to particular claims. But we express skepticism about some claims by evolutionary psychologists and others Prof. Dixson criticizes (e.g., p. 32, where we note that evolutionary psychologists often ignore trait origins; p. 258, where we take issue with particular claims about sperm competition). (At the same time, the idea that the work of evolutionary psychologists can't be trusted because they're evolutionary psychologists of course invokes ad hominem fallacy.) The suggestion that this is a book written from an exclusively evolutionary psychological perspective, and one that uncritically celebrates that approach (his last paragraph), then, is just plain wrong. Prof. Dixson even mistakes the professional identity of one of the two scholars quoted on the back cover (his final paragraph). Mark Pagel is an eminent evolutionary biologist. He is not an evolutionary psychologist.
No doubt, we do offer arguments that are not yet "proven." The book, as we emphasize, was written partly to prompt research agendas. Many of our arguments propose hypotheses, not conclusions. We encourage alternative explanations for interesting phenomena we discuss. More generally, we welcome constructive criticism and discussion of things we did say. But we object when someone criticizes claims we explicitly contradict. Prof. Dixson has been a harsh critic of others who have argued for the importance of EPC in humans (such as Baker and Bellis); perhaps he read much into what we wrote that simply wasn't there. In any event, we hope that we have made ourselves better understood to other readers.
(We had to give a star rating in this response, which, in the long run, should have minimal effect.)
Click Here to see more reviews about: The Evolutionary Biology of Human Female Sexuality
Product Description:
Research conducted in the last fifteen years has placed in question many of the traditional conclusions scholars have formed about human female sexuality. Though conventional wisdom asserts that women's estrus has been evolutionarily lost, Randy Thornhill and Steven W. Gangestad assert that it is present, though concealed. Women, they propose, therefore exhibit two sexualities each ovulatory cycle-estrus and sexuality outside of the estrous phase, extended sexuality-that possess distinct functions. Synthesizing research in behavioral evolution and comparative biology, the authors provide a new theoretical framework for understanding the evolution of human female sexuality, one that is rooted in female sexuality and phylogeny across all vertebrate animals.
Want to buy The Evolutionary Biology of Human Female Sexuality at other amazon sites? Click the corresponding icon below:
